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Abstract
Understanding how people comprehend visual narratives (including picture stories, comics, and
film) requires the combination of traditionally separate theories that span the initial sensory and
perceptual processing of complex visual scenes, the perception of events over time, and compre-
hension of narratives. Existing piecemeal approaches fail to capture the interplay between these
levels of processing. Here, we propose the Scene Perception & Event Comprehension Theory
(SPECT), as applied to visual narratives, which distinguishes between front-end and back-end cog-
nitive processes. Front-end processes occur during single eye fixations and are comprised of atten-
tional selection and information extraction. Back-end processes occur across multiple fixations and
support the construction of event models, which reflect understanding of what is happening now
in a narrative (stored in working memory) and over the course of the entire narrative (stored in
long-term episodic memory). We describe relationships between front- and back-end processes,
and medium-specific differences that likely produce variation in front-end and back-end processes
across media (e.g., picture stories vs. film). We describe several novel research questions derived
from SPECT that we have explored. By addressing these questions, we provide greater insight into
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how attention, information extraction, and event model processes are dynamically coordinated to
perceive and understand complex naturalistic visual events in narratives and the real world.
Keywords: Scene perception; Event perception; Narrative comprehension; Visual narratives; Film;
Comics; Eye movements; Attention
1. Introduction
How do viewers both perceive and understand visual narratives? This is a difficult and
complex question that has not previously been addressed in any comprehensive theory
(but see Cohn, 2013a; Cohn, 2019b). It involves coordinating perceptual and comprehen-
sion processes that operate over multiple images and produce a durable mental model of
a narrative (Loschky, Hutson, Smith, Smith, & Magliano, 2018). Consider Fig. 1A, which
shows three images from Mercer Mayer’s (1967) visual narrative, A Boy, a Dog, and a
Frog. In the first image, the viewer sees a boy carrying a net and a pail, running down a
wooded hill with his dog, toward a frog on a lily pad, in a pond at the bottom of the hill.
The viewer also sees a tree branch close to the ground about halfway down the hill. Sev-
eral things are worth noting here. First, the viewer needs to recognize the boy, net, pail,
dog, frog, lily pad, pond, hill, and tree branch as such. Likewise, the viewer needs to rec-
ognize that the boy and dog are running down the hill, and that the boy is carrying the
net and pail. Research suggests that all of these things can be recognized very rapidly,
with the boy, dog, tree branch, and hill potentially being recognized within the time
frame of a single eye fixation (Fei-Fei, Iyer, Koch, & Perona, 2007). The fact that the
boy and dog are running may also be recognized within the first fixation, or require a fur-
ther fixation to extract the necessary visual detail (Glanemann, 2008; Larson, Hendry, &
Loschky, 2012). The frog may also be too small to detect peripherally and require an
additional fixation (Nelson & Loftus, 1980). Similarly, the fact that the boy is carrying a
net and a pail will likely require one or two further fixations. Importantly, each additional
fixation requires the viewer to attentionally select part of the image for further processing
(Deubel & Schneider, 1996), though these selections are usually made preconsciously
(Belopolsky, Kramer, & Theeuwes, 2008; Memmert, 2006). All of these processes can be
thought of as basic perceptual building blocks of the scene.
But the viewer must also make sense of the how these agents, their actions, objects,
and scene background elements depict events in a narrative. For example, to understand
the narrative, viewers must infer the goal of the boy (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Long,
Golding, & Graesser, 1992; Suh & Trabasso, 1993), which is to the catch the frog. Infer-
ences of this sort can be generated very quickly in the context of reading texts (Long
et al., 1992). When viewing such a picture story, viewers can generate an inference
within two extra fixations on details of the scene that suggest the inference (e.g., the
direction of the boy’s eye gaze relative to the location of the frog, and the position of the
boy’s net, suggest his goal of catching the frog: Hutson et al., 2018).
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The second image shows the boy and dog tripping over the tree branch, with the boy
having let go of his net and pail, and shows the frog noticing these events. Understanding
this picture also requires the same processes of scene perception and attentional selection
described for the first picture, but those processes should be supported by representations
of the prior narrative context held in working memory and episodic memory (Graesser, Mil-
lis, & Zwaan, 1997). Importantly, the boy and dog tripping on the tree branch is inconsistent
with their inferred goal of catching the frog from the first picture;thus, it reflects a failure of
that goal (Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989). Understanding how this picture fits into
the narrative involves inferring the causal relationship between it and the prior narrative
context (e.g., the boy tripped because he was running down the hill and there was a tree
branch blocking his way; the boy failed to achieve his goal) (Trabasso & Suh, 1993). The
final image shows the same scene from a slightly zoomed-in view. This image illustrates
that viewers need to understand how the products of scene perception are related across
Fig. 1. Experimental conditions used to elicit bridging inferences while viewers read a picture story (Hutson,
Magliano, & Loschky, 2018; Magliano, Larson, Higgs, & Loschky, 2016). (A) Complete target episode from
“A Boy, a Dog, and a Frog” (Mayer, 1967), including beginning-state, bridging-event, and end-state images.
(B) The target episode missing the bridging-event image, which requires the viewer to generate a bridging
inference when viewing the end-state image to maintain coherence with the beginning-state image.
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images. The viewer sees boots sticking out of the water and must recognize that those are
the boy’s boots. Establishing this relationship has implications at the level of the narrative
event model because it implies that the boy has fallen in the water, and that this is a result of
his tripping on the tree branch (as depicted in the previous image).
Clearly, this illustrates the coordination of visual perception and narrative comprehen-
sion in the cognitive processing of visual narratives. Thus, it is no surprise that scholars
who study these different levels of cognitive processes have become interested in how
they are involved in visual narratives. Specifically, research on visual narrative processing
has been rapidly expanding in the domains of visual scene perception (e.g., Hutson,
Smith, Magliano, & Loschky, 2017), event perception/cognition (e.g., Zacks, Speer, &
Reynolds, 2009), psycholinguistics (e.g., Cohn, 2013a), and narrative comprehension
(e.g., Magliano, Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, & Zacks, 2012). While these research
areas are seemingly disparate, the above example illustrates that comprehensive theoreti-
cal frameworks are needed to explain how these processes are coordinated to support the
perception and understanding of visual narratives. Additionally, such theoretical frame-
works may be necessary to prevent fragmentation of the visual narrative research field, as
occurred, for example, in reading research, where multiple models accounted for aspects
of reading, such as word identification, syntactic parsing, discourse representations, and
the roles of the reader’s eye movements (Rayner & Reichle, 2010). Thus, the novel theo-
retical contribution of our theoretical framework lies in integrating processes from the
scene perception literature and processes from the event perception and narrative compre-
hension literatures, raising interesting research questions concerning interactions between
them. In this way, research on visual narratives within our framework is an example of
complex cognition that can inform our broader understanding of naturalistic visual pro-
cessing and transcend the currently compartmentalized research on visual narrative pro-
cessing in the separate, minimally interacting research fields.
Below, we outline a theoretical framework, the Scene Perception & Event Comprehen-
sion Theory (SPECT: Loschky et al., 2018), that describes how perceptual processes and
event model construction processes are coordinated during visual narrative processing.
The novel theoretical contribution of SPECT lies in being an integrative theoretical
framework, which identifies important interactions between perceptual and event model
processes. SPECT allows researchers to identify the core perceptual and cognitive pro-
cesses for perceiving and comprehending visual media. Critically, these core processes
are also utilized in non-narrative contexts, such as real-world scenes. In formulating
SPECT, we demonstrate how visual narratives are an example of complex cognition of
broader interest to the cognitive sciences in general.
2. The SPECT framework
SPECT builds on decades of theoretical developments in general cognition and its sub-
systems (e.g. working memory, attentional control, etc.). Thus, SPECT is the application
of general models of visual cognition to visual narratives, and many of SPECT’s
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assumptions equally apply to real-world scene perception. SPECT bridges theories of
scene perception (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999; Irwin, 1996), event cognition (Rad-
vansky & Zacks, 2011, 2014), and narrative comprehension (Gernsbacher, 1990; Zwaan
& Radvansky, 1998). SPECT specifically pertains only to processing visual content;
namely, it does not specify processes involved in processing either language narrowly
defined, or non-linguistic audio. The basic architecture of SPECT distinguishes between
stimulus features and front-end and back-end cognitive processes involved in visual event
and narrative cognition, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that the front-end versus back-end
distinction is not equivalent to bottom-up and top-down processes. We will clarify these
distinctions below. We will briefly overview how these processes are conceptualized in
SPECT before outlining each component in more detail with supporting evidence.
SPECT’s starting point is the stimulus. All visual narratives are composed of either
static (e.g., in Fig. 1) or dynamic (in the case of film, theater, or virtual reality) visual
images of varying degrees of complexity and realism composed in sequence. Some stimu-
lus properties constrain later processes within SPECT via medium–agnostic mechanisms
such as the salience of primitive visual features (e.g., luminance, contrast, or motion; Itti
& Koch, 2001). For example, Fig. 3A shows the computed saliency of the “Beginning
State” image from Fig. 1. For this saliency algorithm (AWS) (Garcia-Diaz, Fdez-Vidal,
Pardo, & Dosil, 2009), the highest computed saliency regions (i.e., most likely to capture
a viewer’s attention) are for the Boy’s head and the Frog’s legs. This is based on analyz-
ing the orientations of image elements at numerous size scales, and finding the local
regions that are the most different from the rest of the image. Fig. 3B shows an actual
fixation heat map, based on 39 viewers’ fixations while viewing this image within the
context of the entire visual narrative. The computed saliency is very close to the empiri-
cal fixation probabilities. Other stimulus properties are medium-specific such as the pan-
els, layout, and action lines in comics, which are assumedly learned, rather than
universal, in contrast to visual saliency (Cohn, 2013b). The three-panel layout of the
images in Fig. 1A is familiar to comic readers, and it is meant to be read from left to
right. In film, camera movements, cuts, and the predetermined pace of the moving images
are similarly meant to guide viewers’ attention (Bordwell & Thompson, 2003). Thus, the
combination of medium-agnostic and medium-specific stimulus features shape what
potential information is available to the viewer, and likely influence how front-end and
back-end processes interact in processing this information.
Front-end processes are involved in extracting content from the image, and back-end
processes operate on their output to support the construction of an event model. Front-
end processes occur during single eye fixations. These processes during a fixation extend
from the earliest perceptual processes to activated semantic representations that are sent
to working memory (WM). The front-end involves two key processes that occur during
each fixation: information extraction and attentional selection. Information extraction is
further subdivided between broad (the gist of the whole scene, e.g., woods) and narrow
(detailed information from animate or inanimate entities, e.g., boy, dog, frog, net, pail,
etc., in Fig. 1). Information extraction includes both entities and events, with event infor-
mation extraction also producing both broad categorizations of what is seen (e.g., “trying
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to catch”) and narrow categorizations (e.g., “running” in Fig. 1). The information
extracted during each fixation is fed to the back-end. Attentional selection determines
what information to process during single fixations, and where the eyes will be sent for
the next fixation, and is influenced by both exogenous and endogenous factors. Note that
the above definition of front-end processes is far more specific (i.e., occurring during
Fig. 2. Model of the Scene Perception & Event Comprehension Theory (SPECT) theoretical framework. The
eye icon denotes the position of viewer gaze on the stimulus during a particular fixation. A further walk-
through of the framework is provided in the text below.
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single fixations) and limited (i.e., information extraction and attentional selection) than
the term bottom-up processes, and thus the two terms are not synonymous.
Back-end processes occur in memory across multiple eye fixations, specifically WM
and long-term memory (LTM). The information represented in the back-end is accumu-
lated over multiple eye fixations spanning durations extending from milliseconds to min-
utes. A key back-end process is the construction and maintenance of the current event
model in WM, which represents what is happening now (e.g., a boy and his dog, trying
to catch a frog in the woods, in Fig. 1). An event model is a particular type of mental
model that captures a sequenced event. This representation is maintained until perceptual
and conceptual content specifies that it is no longer relevant or valid (due to content
changing over time–the boy’s falling in the pond indicates the failure of his attempt to
catch the frog, in Fig. 1). At that point, back-end processes encode the event model into
episodic LTM, which we call a stored event model (e.g., the boy and dog tried to catch a
Fig. 3. (A) Example of computationally predicted visual saliency of regions in the Beginning-State image of
Fig. 1, using the AWS saliency algorithm (Garcia-Diaz et al., 2009). (B) Fixation heat map from 39 viewers
reading the wordless visual narrative. In both images, red = highest saliency/fixation probability. (Saliency
and fixation heat map images courtesy of Maverick E. Smith.)
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frog in the woods, but fell in the pond, in Fig. 1). From these stored event models, more
semantic event schemas can be derived in semantic LTM by averaging across multiple
event model instances (e.g., Hintzman, 1988). The recently stored event models in episo-
dic LTM will feed back to and influence the new current event model in WM (e.g., the
expectation that the boy may make another attempt to catch the frog; see information
arrows back from Episodic Memory to the Event Model in Fig. 2). The current event
model is also influenced by schemas in semantic LTM (e.g., “little boys,” “catching ani-
mals,” etc.), and from executive functions, like goal setting, attention control, and inhibi-
tion. Note too that the above definition of back-end processes is also more specific (i.e.,
in memory across multiple fixations) and limited (to the event model building processes
in WM, the stored event model in episodic LTM, stored knowledge in semantic LTM)
than the term bottom-up processes.
An underlying assumption of SPECT is that front-end and back-end processes itera-
tively support the creation of the current event model in WM, and the management of
stored event models in episodic LTM. Importantly, front-end attentional selection and
information extraction guide the moment-to-moment knowledge retrieval from semantic
LTM that supports the back-end processes of creating the current event model in WM
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998; Myers & O’Brien, 1998). Thus, we cannot understand how
knowledge is retrieved from LTM in the moment without understanding the role of these
front-end processes. Similarly, a key theoretical issue raised by SPECT is whether and
how back-end processes, including the current event model in WM, the stored event mod-
els in episodic LTM, and schemas and scripts in semantic LTM, influence the front-end
information extraction and attentional selection processes. Thus, SPECT provides a theo-
retical framework to explore and explain the relationships between front- and back-end
processes during visual narrative processing.
2.1. Theoretical foundations for front-end processes
When looking at real-world scenes, comics, or videos, visual information extraction
only occurs during periods in which the eyes are stabilized relative to fixed points in
space (fixations) or slowly moving objects (smooth pursuit or vestibulo–ocular reflex).
This is because processing of visual detail is suppressed during the rapid shifts (saccadic
eye movements) between locations (Matin, 1974; Ross, Morrone, Goldberg, & Burr,
2001). Thus, we can consider eye fixations1 to be the spatio-temporal input units of
vision. Furthermore, any extracted information maintained across multiple fixations is in
short-term memory or WM (Irwin, 1996; Zelinsky & Loschky, 2005),2 which is strongly
constrained in terms of capacity (i.e., 3–4 items without rehearsal or chunking: Cowan,
2001), and encodable information (i.e., post-perceptual information: Hollingworth, 2009;
Irwin, 1996). This key insight provides the rationale for distinguishing between front-end
processes occurring during single fixations, and back-end processes occurring across mul-
tiple fixations occurring in memory. Furthermore, these constraints from eye movements
necessarily shape how events in the environment, comics, or films are understood and
become long-term episodic memories.
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2.1.1. Information extraction
What types of information are extracted during a single eye fixation? SPECT distin-
guishes broad versus narrow information extraction (Loschky et al., 2018). Broad extrac-
tion is from all or most of an entire scene, producing holistic semantic information called
scene gist (Oliva, 2005). This includes the basic level category of a scene (e.g., woods, a
pond, in Fig. 1) (Fei-Fei et al., 2007; Greene & Oliva, 2009; Loschky & Larson, 2010),
detecting animals or people (Fletcher-Watson, Findlay, Leekam, & Benson, 2008; Thorpe,
Fize, & Marlot, 1996), the scene’s emotional valence (Calvo, Nummenmaa, & Hy€on€a,
2007; Maljkovic & Martini, 2005), some rather rudimentary information about basic level
actions (e.g., running vs. falling in Fig. 1) (Larson, 2012), and both the agent and patient
of an action (e.g., the boy [agent] trying to catch the frog [patient], in Fig. 1) (Dobel,
Gumnior, B€olte, & Zwitserlood, 2007; Hafri, Papafragou, & Trueswell, 2013). Narrow
extraction operates on a particular entity (object, animal, or person) providing details such
as colors, shapes, and sizes of object parts (Hollingworth, 2009; Pertzov, Avidan, & Zoh-
ary, 2009). Such broadly and narrowly extracted information in WM is used for compre-
hending events by back-end processes in the current event model. Importantly, despite
the wide range of information extracted during a single eye fixation, the total amount of
consciously available information from a single fixation remains limited, and thus increas-
ingly detailed information from a scene or image must accrue in WM over multiple fixa-
tions (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Pertzov et al., 2009) in the back-end. One slight
caveat to this assumption of SPECT is that fixations are actually made up of micro move-
ments (e.g. microsaccades, drift, etc), which may constitute phases of slight attentional
shifts and changes in perceived information within a single fixation (Otero-Millan, Tron-
coso, Macknik, Serrano-Pedraza, & Martinez-Conde, 2008) and that the phases of attend-
ing to and processing a specific object could also be made up of multiple fixations
dwelling within the object (Nuthmann & Henderson, 2010). Since both of these behaviors
can still be considered fixations at different spatiotemporal scales, we will use the all-en-
compassing term fixation within SPECT.
2.1.2. Attentional selection
The other key front-end process during each fixation is attentional selection, which is
the gateway to WM, comprehension, and explicit LTM for events. On each fixation,
before moving the eyes, attention covertly shifts to the next to-be-fixated object (Deubel
& Schneider, 1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, &
Blaser, 1995). Attentional selection is affected by both exogenous, bottom-up, stimulus
saliency, as described above (Borji & Itti, 2013; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004), and endoge-
nous, top-down, cognitive processes (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Eckstein, Drescher, &
Shimozaki, 2006; Findlay & Walker, 1999). Specifically, stimulus saliency is determined
by visual feature contrast in terms of motion, brightness, color, orientation, and size
(Mital, Smith, Hill, & Henderson, 2010; Peters, Iyer, Itti, & Koch, 2005). However, top-
down, task-driven goals, such as searching for specific information, more strongly affect
viewers’ attention than saliency in pictures (Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; Henderson,
Brockmole, Castelhano, & Mack, 2007), and some evidence of saliency-override by task
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has been demonstrated in film viewing, although this is believed to be more difficult
(Hutson et al., 2017; Smith & Mital, 2013). More specifically, there are volitional (con-
sciously controlled) versus mandatory (unconscious prior knowledge-based) top-down
effects on attentional selection (Baluch & Itti, 2011). These can interact in tasks, such as
visual search, in which the volitional top-down goal of finding a specific target (e.g., a
chimney) is facilitated by mandatory top-down knowledge of likely target locations (e.g.,
at the top of a house: Eckstein et al., 2006; Torralba, Oliva, Castelhano, & Henderson,
2006). In SPECT, volitional top-down attentional control occurs in WM, using executive
processes (Moss, Schunn, Schneider, McNamara, & VanLehn, 2011). Mandatory top-
down processes can come from the event model or relevant world knowledge (i.e., sche-
mas).
Attentional selection during single fixations can be narrowly focused, for example at
the point of fixation, or broadly spread across a large portion of the visual field, also
known as attentional breadth, or a person’s useful field of view (Ball, Beard, Roenker,
Miller, & Griggs, 1988; Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Larson, Freeman, Ringer, & Loschky,
2014). Importantly, this can change dynamically based on the viewer’s processing
demands (Ringer, Throneburg, Johnson, Kramer, & Loschky, 2016; Williams, 1988). A
viewer’s breadth of attention also changes over the course of ~12–24 fixations in the first
4–6 s of viewing an image in the ambient-to-focal shift of eye movements (Pannasch,
Helmert, Roth, Herbold, & Walter, 2008; Smith & Mital, 2013). Specifically, during the
first 2 s of viewing an image, viewers tend to make long saccades, indicating broad atten-
tion, and short fixations, indicating shallow processing. Then, from 4 to 6 s of viewing,
viewers shift to making short saccades, indicating narrowly focused attention, and long
fixations, indicating deeper processing. Because this ambient-to-focal shift occurs across
multiple fixations, back-end processes could possibly influence the front-end process of
attentional selection.
While information extraction and attentional selection are considered independent
within SPECT, and strong empirical and theoretical evidence supports their separation
(Smith, Lamont, & Henderson, 2012; Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003), in
active processing of scenes, these processes often operate in conjunction (Williams, Hen-
derson, & Zacks, 2005). For example, when discussing how a viewer’s fixation of an
object influences his or her memory for it, we implicitly combine both attentional selec-
tion (i.e., choosing which object to send your eyes to) and information extraction (i.e.,
visual processing during the viewer’s fixation on the object, as implicated by their later
memory of it). As such, for parsimony we will sometimes refer to both processes together
in later discussions.
2.2. Theoretical foundations for back-end processes
Back-end processes support the construction of a coherent current event model in WM,
which later becomes a stored event model in episodic LTM (Magliano et al., 2012). A
coherent event model contains information about the time and place in which the events
unfold (the spatio-temporal framework), the entities in the event (people, animals,
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objects), the properties of those entities (e.g., colors, sizes, emotions, goals), the actions
of the agents, the unintentional events that occur (e.g., acts of nature), and relational
information (spatial, temporal, causal, ownership, kinship, social, etc.) (Magliano, Miller,
& Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). As
shown in Fig. 2, SPECT describes three key back-end processes involved in constructing
the current event model: laying the foundation for a new event model, mapping incoming
information to the current event model, and shifting to create a new event model (Gerns-
bacher, 1990).
2.2.1. Laying the foundation
Laying the foundation is the process of constructing the first nodes in an event model,
where a node reflects a basic unit of representation (e.g., proposition, simple grounded
simulation). These nodes then become memory structures to which subsequent informa-
tion is connected or not (Gernsbacher, 1990, 1997). When a new event model is created,
the viewer must lay the foundation for it. In the context of a visual narrative, the founda-
tion will likely involve a representation of the spatial-temporal information that is
extracted through gist processing, and any agents and actions recognized in the first fixa-
tion of the images.
As noted above, the information extraction process can gather some rudimentary infor-
mation about basic level actions, including the agent and the patient, within a single eye
fixation (Glanemann, 2008; Hafri et al., 2013). However, due to the limits of information
processing within the time span of a single fixation (e.g., 330 ms), it takes at least two
fixations to reach peak accuracy for identifying an action (Hafri et al., 2013; Larson,
2012). Thus, the information required to lay the foundation for the current event model,
namely recognizing a basic action, requires integrating information across at least two fix-
ations in WM.
2.2.2. Mapping incoming information
With each subsequent fixation, the viewer builds upon the foundation by mapping
incoming information to WM, but only if it is coherent with the event model (Gerns-
bacher, 1990, 1997). This process involves monitoring continuities in the event indices of
time, space, entities, causality, and goals (Gernsbacher, 1997; Zwaan & Radvansky,
1998). Specifically, situational information extracted by front-end processes serves as
LTM retrieval cues, thus activating semantically related information in WM (Myers &
O’Brien, 1998). Viewers assess the coherence of the event indices within the current
event model and the newly activated information from LTM. Changes along any event
index that are coherent with the current event model will lead viewers to incrementally
update, or map, that change (Kurby & Zacks, 2012). In this way, the current event model
becomes gradually elaborated as more information is extracted on each eye fixation.
Mapping is supported by inference generation (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994),
particularly bridging inferences (Magliano, Zwaan, & Graesser, 1999). Bridging infer-
ences connect two or more story events and are considered necessary for maintaining a
coherent mental model (Graesser et al., 1994). Virtually all comprehension models
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consider bridging inferences important (McNamara & Magliano, 2009) because they are
required when comprehenders perceive a gap in the narrative events (e.g., Magliano
et al., 2016), or when two narrative events are causally related (e.g., Suh & Trabasso,
1993). For example, in Fig. 1B, the Bridging-Event image shown in Fig. 1A is missing.
Thus, for viewers seeing only the Beginning-State and End-State images in Fig. 1B, they
would need to generate a bridging inference to coherently map the information from the
End-State image (boy and dog fell in the pond) onto the foundation of the event model
created based on the information from the Beginning State image (boy and dog running
down the hill to catch a frog).
2.2.3. Shifting
When mapping is no longer possible, the viewer shifts to create a new event model. This
occurs when new incoming information produces a trigger signal, resulting in event seg-
mentation, which parses this continuous activity into discrete events (Kurby & Zacks, 2008;
Magliano et al., 2012). For example, when watching someone making breakfast, we recog-
nize the discrete actions of taking a slice of bread out of a loaf, putting the slice in a toaster,
toasting it, taking it out of the toaster, and putting it on a plate (Newtson, 1973; Newtson,
Engquist, & Bois, 1977). Segmentation is critical for understanding and remembering
complex events (Magliano et al., 2012; Radvansky & Zacks, 2011; Sargent et al., 2013).
Segmentation also occurs when we experience narratives, and triggers can be either
perceptual or more conceptual in nature. For example, visual motion is strongly associ-
ated with event segmentation (Zacks, Swallow, Vettel, & McAvoy, 2006). Other impor-
tant triggers are when viewers perceive shifts in situational continuities, such as shifts in
time and space, causal discontinuities, the introduction of new characters, or changes in
characters’ goal-plans (Magliano et al., 2012; Zacks et al., 2009; Zwaan & Radvansky,
1998). If such changes are important enough, it indicates an event boundary, also known
in older story grammar theories as a boundary between narrative episodes (Baggett, 1979;
Gernsbacher, 1985; Thorndyke, 1977). For example, most readers of the visual narrative
fragment in Fig. 1 will perceive an event boundary to have occurred on the End-State
image, assumedly because the Boy’s attempt to achieve his goal of catching the Frog has
failed. Perceiving an event boundary means the current event has ended, which triggers a
shift (Kurby & Zacks, 2012), and leads to storing the current event model in LTM as a
global update to the previously stored event models in episodic LTM (Gernsbacher,
1985). Once this boundary has been perceived and the stored event model updated, infor-
mation from the previous event model becomes less accessible (Gernsbacher, 1985; Swal-
low, Zacks, & Abrams, 2009). Once shifting is complete, the cycle begins again with
laying the foundation for a new event model.
2.3. Executive processes
The back-end comprehension processes discussed above occur by default without the
viewer’s volition. Yet viewers can exert volitional control over their mental processes
when they feel the need to do so. This likely happens when the viewer is given a task
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unrelated to understanding the story while viewing a visual narrative (Hutson et al., 2017;
Lahnakoski et al., 2014). This seems relatively uncommon when people read comics or
watch movies for pleasure, but it is very common when students are given educational
tasks in school settings (Britt, Rouet, & Durik, 2018; McCrudden, Magliano, & Schraw,
2010). Such volitional strategic comprehension processes are more cognitively demanding
(Kaakinen, Hy€on€a, & Keenan, 2003), and they engage frontal and prefrontal brain regions
known to be involved in executive processes (Moss et al., 2011). This suggests that voli-
tional control of comprehension processes involves executive processes, such as goal set-
ting (i.e., deciding to carry out a specified task), attentional control (i.e., paying attention
to task-relevant information), and inhibition (i.e., intentionally ignoring irrelevant infor-
mation), as indicated in Fig. 2. For example, in Hutson et al. (2017, Exp 2B), prior to
watching a film clip from Touch of Evil, viewers were told that after watching the clip,
they would be asked to draw a map of all landmarks and their relative locations from
memory. Assumedly, doing this task successfully would involve setting the goal of mem-
orizing the landmarks and their locations, volitionally controlling one’s attention to meet
this goal (e.g., by fixating background buildings, street signs, etc.), and inhibiting attend-
ing to the protagonists of the narrative (which would conflict with the spatial memoriza-
tion goal). We assume that such executive processes are available to viewers of visual
narratives, but they only use them when necessary, and only if they have the required
WM resources, given their cognitive load, and the processing demands of the stimulus
(e.g., rapidly edited film sequences may overload cognitive resources: Andreu-Sanchez,
Martın-Pascual, Gruart, & Delgado-Garcıa, 2018; Lang, 2000).
3. Differences between static and dynamic media
There are potential differences in the complexities of processing narratives across
media (Loschky et al., 2018; Magliano, Loschky, Clinton, & Larson, 2013). First, a grow-
ing literature indicates that fluency in processing visual narratives requires exposure and
learning (Cohn & Kutas, 2017; Fussell & Haaland, 1978; Ildirar & Schwan, 2014; Lid-
dell, 1997). This may explain why proficiency in comprehending text is weakly correlated
with proficiency in comprehending visual narratives in children (Pezdek, Lehrer, &
Simon, 1984), whereas they are robustly correlated in adults (Gernsbacher, Varner, &
Faust, 1990). Second, there are non-trivial cultural differences in the structure of visual
narratives across cultures, which in turn produce non-trivial differences in comprehension
(Cohn & Kutas, 2017). Finally, the extent to which attentional selection can support event
segmentation, inference generation, and model updating may be affected by whether con-
sumption of the visual narrative is self-paced or externally controlled (Hutson et al.,
2018; Magliano et al., 2013), a difference which SPECT is intended to describe.
Attentional selection and subsequent processing will also be shaped by medium-speci-
fic differences between reading comics or text and viewing films (Magliano et al., 2013).
The static versus dynamic nature of visual narratives has a strong effect on the front-end
process of attentional selection, as shown in Fig. 4, since viewers show greater attentional
L. C. Loschky et al. / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019) 13
synchrony (i.e., looking at the same places at the same times) during a video clip in com-
parison to individual frames from the same video (Dorr, Martinetz, Gegenfurtner, &
Barth, 2010; Smith & Mital, 2013). Viewers may tend to fixate similar locations in static
scene perception (Mannan, Ruddock, & Wooding, 1997) but not at the same time, sug-
gesting a larger influence of individual differences in both front- and back-end processes
for static images (Hayes & Henderson, 2018; Le Meur, Le Callet, & Barba, 2007). Con-
sistent with the finding of greater attentional synchrony during film viewing, motion is
perhaps the most salient stimulus feature in guiding attention (Carmi & Itti, 2006; Le
Meur et al., 2007; Mital et al., 2010). Another important medium-specific difference
between comics and film, which will affect attentional selection, is the typical way each
is viewed. When people read comics, their eyes move from panel to panel of a page lay-
out, which stereotypically follows a “Z-path” of left-to-right and top-to-bottom, consistent
with text (though the specific pattern varies by language, such as Hebrew and Japanese
being read from right to left, and top to bottom). This is entirely different from film
viewing, which instead shows a viewing pattern oriented toward the center of the screen
due, in part, to the temporal presentation of visual information (Dorr et al., 2010; Le
Meur et al., 2007; Mital et al., 2010).
Perhaps just as importantly, in reading both text and comics, comprehension differ-
ences are evident in the duration of fixations and the frequency of regressive saccades
(Foulsham, Wybrow, & Cohn, 2016; Hutson et al., 2018; Laubrock, Hohenstein, & Kum-
merer, 2018; Rayner, 1998). Conversely, the predetermined pace of film does not provide
viewers much time to look around and refixate things, when they have difficulty under-
standing what they saw (although this may occur more while watching digital video,
where viewers can pause, stop, or rewind the video). Consider Fig. 5, which shows two
different versions of the same scene from the graphic novel Watchmen (Moore & Gib-
bons, 1987) and the film adaptation of it (Snyder, 2009). The events depicted in both ver-
sions are identical. One would expect the general products of information extraction to be
similar when processing either version. However, the graphic narrative affords more
endogenous control of attentional selection because it is a static representation of the
events. In contrast, the dynamic presentation of the film version has cinematic features
that provide stronger exogenous influences on attentional selection such as dynamic fram-
ing through camera movements (e.g., the single zoom shot pulling back from the Come-
dian’s badge in the film version versus the three frames depicting the same change in
viewpoint in the comic; Fig. 5, middle row), lighting and focal depth changes, and chore-
ography of actor motion within the frame (Hutson et al., 2017; Loschky, Larson,
Magliano, & Smith, 2015; Smith, 2012a).
The scene depicted in Fig. 5 is predominantly action based, which means that the
movie stills (essentially a storyboard) roughly convey the same content as the original
comic version (as was intended for this particular film). The comic version may place
more demands on back-end processes to guide attention and actively construct the event
model than when viewing the movie version, for which the events are self-evident in the
actions depicted. But in a scene like this it would seem reasonable to assume the resulting
narrative event models would be medium-agnostic.
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However, for scenes involving richer characterization and dialogue, the formal deci-
sions comic artists and film directors make when composing their scenes may result in
very different event models. For example, Fig. 6 depicts a later scene from Watchmen in
which Rorschach meets with his old partner, Nite Owl. The comic version uses four pan-
els each containing multiple visual centers of interest.3 The reader likely must perform
multiple fixations within each panel to extract information about the characters, their
actions, and Nite Owl’s emotional response to Rorschach (Laubrock et al., 2018). By
comparison, the film version uses 12 shots varying widely in shot scale to convey the
same information. By conveying each action serially (i.e., one per shot) this likely
reduces the need for multiple fixations per shot, which raises interesting questions about
whether back-end WM processes would differ depending on the number of front-end
attentional shifts and fixations across media. Studies of medium differences in front-end
attentional selection and information extraction on back-end processes process have been
Fig. 4. The difference in gaze exploration of a scene (represented as a fixation heatmap of multiple viewers’
gaze locations) across static (top row) and dynamic versions (bottom row), and free-viewing (left column)
versus a spot-the-location task, which prioritizes background details (right column). Note that the most tightly
clustered gaze is in the dynamic free-viewing condition, which contains motion. Note, also though, that this
gaze clustering due to motion is somewhat reduced by giving viewers an explicit task (i.e., spot-the-location).
(Reproduced with permission from Smith and Mital [2013].)
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largely unexplored (Magliano, Clinton, O’Brien, & Rapp, 2018). However, the SPECT
framework specifies the importance of exploring these issues.
4. Research questions raised by SPECT and their investigation
We have been using this framework to guide our program of research on the process-
ing of visual narratives (both static and dynamic) for the past 8 years. Most of these stud-
ies have directly involved narratives, but a few have involved non-narrative content that
mirrors important features of visual narratives. In those cases, we have adopted that
approach because it afforded the experimental control needed to ask and answer the cen-
tral questions raised by SPECT regarding processes involved in visual narratives. In addi-
tion, SPECT suggests that the distinction between static narratives and film may be
important for attentional selection because the two media differ in terms of their degree
Fig. 5. Sample panels/stills from the original Watchmen (Moore & Gibbons, 1987) graphic novel and movie
(Snyder, 2009) depicting the same actions. Note the images are not presented in their original sequence.
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of visual salience (e.g., due to film having motion, but not comics). Nevertheless, to date,
we have not made within-study comparisons between film and comics using the same
content. With those caveats, in this section, we will illustrate SPECT’s utility as a theo-
retical framework to guide research on the coordination of information extraction, atten-
tional selection, basic event cognition, and event model construction in processing visual
narratives.
To date, we have investigated two key lines of research, one regarding information
extraction, and the other regarding attentional selection. Regarding information extraction,
we have previously carried out studies on the discourse comprehension of visual narra-
tives, which show how viewers monitor situation indices in their current event model,
which then affects their event segmentation. However, those studies beg the question,
Fig. 6. Rorschach surprises Nite Owl in his kitchen and reveals the Comedian has died. Top row: panels
taken from the original Watchmen (Moore & Gibbons, 1987) graphic novel. Bottom three rows: shots depict-
ing the same action from the movie version (Snyder, 2009).
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what information is extracted during single fixations in the front-end? SPECT provides a
framework for asking questions about how information extraction affects event model
construction. Thus, we have investigated how extracting information on the viewer’s first
fixation on a new scene allows the viewer to lay the foundation of a new event model
(Larson et al., 2012), and how that newly laid foundation primes extraction of further
event indices on further fixations (Larson & Lee, 2015). We have also investigated how
laying the foundation of the event model can, in turn, allow the viewer to predict what
spatiotemporal context he or she will see next, which influences further information
extraction on subsequent eye fixations (Smith & Loschky, in press). This can lead to fur-
ther questions, such as how are subsequent event indices mapped onto an existing event
model or signify an event model shift?
Regarding attentional selection, we have investigated how it is influenced by event
model construction while viewing visual narratives, including both static picture stories
and film (Hutson et al., 2017, 2018; Loschky et al., 2015). Specifically, we have studied
how mapping incoming information to the current event model guides attentional selec-
tion in visual narratives with static images (picture stories) (Hutson et al., 2018). More
specifically, how does the mapping process in the event model, and its subprocess of
bridging inference generation, affect attentional selection, as measured by what viewers
fixate on in a given picture in a visual narrative. We have also studied how the current
and stored event models guide attentional selection in dynamic visual narratives (film
clips) (Hutson et al., 2017; Loschky et al., 2015). More specifically, how does the map-
ping process in the event model, and its subprocess of predictive inference generation
(forward mapping), affect attentional selection, as measured by what viewers look at from
moment to moment while watching a narrative film?
Below, we discuss these studies, what they have shown that speaks to the SPECT
framework, and a non-exhaustive sample of other relevant work that speaks to the same
issues. We describe these studies in sections below, first on The Relationship between
Information Extraction and Event Model Construction, and second on The Relationship
between Event Model Construction and Attentional Selection.
4.1. The relationship between information extraction and event model construction
According to SPECT, the first stage of creating an event model is laying its founda-
tion. This iteratively operates as one processes each picture (or frame) in a visual narra-
tive, in a manner akin to the processes that support reading sentences in the context of
narrative text (Magliano et al., 2013). For example, when viewing the first image of
Fig. 1A (labeled “Beginning State”), the reader needs to quickly perceive who is doing
what, when, and where. SPECT raises critical questions about how the process of infor-
mation extraction, on each eye fixation enables the viewer to lay the foundation over the
course of the first few eye fixations. Is there a temporal order in which the viewer recog-
nizes that the scene takes place on a wooded hill, that there is a boy and a dog, and that
they are both running? Perhaps the viewer recognizes the boy, the dog, and the wooded
hill on the first fixation and stores that information as event indices in the foundation of
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the new event model.4 And perhaps the viewer recognizes that both boy and dog are run-
ning down the hill on the second fixation and map that onto the foundation of the event
model. If so, could this temporal order of information extraction imply that recognizing
the spatiotemporal context (“wooded hill”) on the first fixation facilitates recognizing the
event (“running down the hill”) on the second fixation? Alternatively, since comprehend-
ing a narrative requires recognizing the main character and his or her actions, perhaps the
foundation of the event model requires recognizing this event information within the first
eye fixation (Dobel et al., 2007; Hafri et al., 2013). Furthermore, attention is strongly
biased to people in scene images within a single fixation (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2008;
Humphrey & Underwood, 2010; Zwickel & V~o, 2010). These two points strongly suggest
that people and their actions form the basis of an event model.
Larson (2012) explored these above issues within a non-narrative context, in order to
gain an understanding of the processes involved when looking at the very first image in a
narrative. Specifically, Larson (2012) examined the rapid categorization of locations and
actions in static photographic scenes both within single eye fixations, and across multiple
fixations. Larson found that viewers were able to rapidly categorize locations within a sin-
gle fixation, but that actions required a second fixation. This suggests that laying the foun-
dation consists of first recognizing the spatiotemporal framework, and then recognizing and
mapping the actions that entities carry out within it. In a further study, Larson and Lee
(2015) found that recognizing an action was facilitated by seeing it within the context of a
recognizable scene. Importantly, however, this facilitation was only found after viewers
had processed the image long enough to relatively accurately recognize the scene context
(about 100 ms). Nevertheless, we have yet to explore if this hierarchy of recognizing the
spatiotemporal framework first and then action occurs across pictures in a visual narrative.
SPECT raises further questions about the relationship between information extraction,
laying the foundation, and mapping to the current event model, in the context of visual
narrative sequences. For example, in Fig. 1A, according to SPECT, the boy’s spatiotem-
poral context (i.e., “wooded hill”) will be extracted while viewing the first picture, and
stored as the foundation of the event model in working memory. A key question raised
by SPECT is whether that foundation should facilitate information extraction of the spa-
tiotemporal context on the subsequently viewed second and third pictures in Fig. 1A.
Similar to anticipatory processes in language processing, we would expect to find priming
of the upcoming spatiotemporal contexts, whether they remain the same, as in Fig. 1A
(all showing a “wooded hill”), or they are different but spatiotemporally related (e.g., a
transition from the wooded area into a field), but not if they clash with expectations (e.g.,
a transition from the wooded area into a bustling city street).
Smith and Loschky (in press) have investigated the above questions using simple first-
person visual narratives of traveling from one location to another (e.g., going from an
office to a parking lot) akin to the short narratives often used by discourse psychologists.
As shown in Fig. 7, that study presented viewers with short narrative sequences of 0–9
scene priming images, each briefly flashed for enough time to both recognize and store
them in working memory (about 300 ms), followed by a single target image that was
briefly flashed and immediately masked to limit processing time (for 24 ms), after which
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the viewer was asked the categorize the target scene. The key manipulation was to present
the image sequences in coherent versus randomized order. The results showed that viewers
were much more accurate at categorizing the scenes shown in coherent sequences than in
randomized sequences, showing clear priming of the current spatiotemporal context by the
preceding context. Furthermore, the priming was greater when the priming was from the
same category as the target (e.g., the second of two hallways in a row) than from a different
but spatiotemporally related category to the target (e.g., a hallway seen immediately after
one or more office images). This is consistent with the above hypothetical scenario for pro-
cessing the image sequence in Fig. 1A, in which recognition of the second and third
“wooded hill” images would be primed by recognizing the first such image. However,
Smith and Loschky’s (in press) results also showed that expectations about up-coming dif-
ferent spatiotemporal contexts also produced priming, but to a lesser degree.
Finally, Smith and Loschky (in press) investigated whether the spatiotemporal priming
shown in coherent image sequences was simply due to response biases (i.e., guessing the
scene category at the time of being tested), or was actually due to facilitation of percep-
tual sensitivity. To tease apart those possibilities, they showed participants the exact same
coherent and randomized image sequences, but participants’ task was changed from (1)
identifying the scene category of the target to (2) visually discriminating whether the tar-
get was a real scene image or a noise image (with a 50/50 mix of both types of target
images). Note that a viewer’s ability to predict the category of the next scene should not
bias him or her to respond either “real scene” or “noise image.” Importantly, the results
showed that participants were more perceptually sensitive to targets in the coherent than
the randomized scene sequences, while their response bias was neutral (i.e., they equally
responded “real scene” vs. “random noise”) and did not differ between the coherent and
randomized sequences. Thus, a viewer’s expectations about the up-coming spatiotemporal
context can facilitate their perception of that context.
4.1.1. Further research on the relationship between information extraction, attentional
selection, and event model construction
A limitation of the above studies is that they either used only single images, or mini-
mal visual narratives, rather than the more naturalistic ones found in comics, picture sto-
ries, and film. As previously discussed, the perceptual processing demands of static
versus dynamic visual narratives differ greatly and these may alter the degree to which
back-end processing influences front-end attentional selection and information extraction.
For example, Smith and colleagues (Smith & Henderson, 2008; Smith & Martin-Por-
tugues Santacreu, 2017) have demonstrated that continuity of a basic level action percept
across a cut can obscure viewer awareness of the cut (i.e., edit blindness), which involved
a global change in viewpoint of the spatiotemporal context. Object features and even
actor identity can also change across cuts without viewers noticing (Levin & Simons,
1997). Diminished awareness of the shot change only occurs if sufficient action motion is
present across the cut (hence the film technique name Match-On-Action: Smith & Mar-
tin-Portugues Santacreu, 2017), suggesting that viewers may often lack the capacity (e.g.,
attentional resources, working memory, or executive resources) to encode detailed surface
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information that does not change key event indices (Sampanes, Tseng, & Bridgeman,
2008) or that such information is obscured by the image motion (Smith, 2012a). Similar
failures to notice differences between two different versions of the same static image are
well known from “spot the difference” tasks. Assumedly, such changes are also missed in
Fig. 7. Experimental conditions used by Smith and Loschky (in press) to investigate priming of the current spa-
tiotemporal context by the preceding context. Viewers saw either spatiotemporally coherent or randomized
image sequences ending with a briefly flashed and visually masked target image. Participants then identified the
scene category of the target from a list of all possible scene categories in that sequence. The coherent spatiotem-
poral sequence shows two office images followed by a hallway image, taken from a route from office to parking
lot. The randomized sequence shows a parking lot, a stairwell, and then the target hallway image. Participants
found the target images more predictable and were more accurate at identifying them, when presented in coher-
ent sequences. (A) shows the beginnings of two sequences, including 2 primes, the target, and the response
screen, in the (i) coherent, and (ii) randomized conditions. (B) shows a more complete representation of each
sequence of 10 images, including those images that appeared after the participant’s response.
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comics across pairs of adjacent busy panels sharing much of the same background.
Within the Attentional Theory of Cinematic Continuity (AToCC) (Smith, 2012a, 2012b),
these effects are explained as postdiction, the backwards inference of the details of the
event after it has begun rather than predictive inference (Smith & Martin-Portugues San-
tacreu, 2017). Whether this absence of predictive inference is specific to the fast-paced
sequences used in these studies is not currently known. In fact, such postdictive infer-
ences are very similar to the bridging inferences that have shown to be commonly drawn
in picture story studies (Hutson et al., 2018; Magliano et al., 2016). Predictive inferences
do obviously occur in film, with many having been intentionally targeted by the filmmak-
ers through filmmaking techniques (Magliano, Dijkstra, & Zwaan, 1996). Thus, it is pos-
sible that postdictive bridging inferences are more commonly generated during film
viewing than predictive inferences, which appears to also be the case with narrative text
(Graesser et al., 1994; Magliano et al., 1996).
However, not all cuts are missed, and their rate of detection is in proportion to the
number of spatiotemporal and semantic features changed across the cut (Smith & Hender-
son, 2008; Smith & Martin-Portugues Santacreu, 2017) and object changes will be
noticed if they change meaning, even if the changes are relatively small (Sampanes et al.,
2008). In support of this, recent eye movement evidence indicates that low-level visual
salience does not entirely account for gaze biases toward continued scene content across
cuts—instead, memory-guided attention facilitates the deployment of attention but only if
the viewer is actively tracking scene content (Valuch, K€onig, & Ansorge, 2017). Whether
such active tracking occurs automatically during visual narrative viewing is currently
unknown. However, it is worth noting that drawn American visual narratives often cir-
cumvent this processing, by first introducing an environment early on in a sequence, and
then leaving out the background entirely in later panels, though this intuition should be
tested with corpus analyses.
Within the SPECT framework, we would suggest that important event indices are
tracked by viewers across shots and cuts, interacting with visual salience to guide atten-
tion and gaze, and allowing changes to important semantic features of a scene to be
detected (e.g., entities or actions that could change the goals of a protagonist in the visual
narrative) but allowing unimportant features to pass unnoticed. Indeed, what constitutes
an important event index has been the subject of much study in the event perception liter-
ature. Studies analyzing the likelihood of discontinuities in particular feature dimensions
being perceived as event boundaries during film viewing have revealed that discontinu-
ities of the goal of characters trump space and time (Magliano & Zacks, 2011). Exactly
what information is used to construct and maintain a representation of action, or to detect
changes to it, is currently unclear and will require further study in terms of the stages of
processing outlined by SPECT.
4.1.2. Conclusions regarding information extraction and event model construction
Thus far, the studies by Larson (Larson, 2012; Larson & Lee, 2015) and Smith and
Loschky (in press) have shown how rapid scene categorization processes, typically
investigated by scene perception researchers, interact with higher-level event model
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processes, such as laying the foundation and mapping, typically studied by discourse
comprehension researchers. These studies have shown evidence for a temporal order of
processing event indices in which the spatiotemporal context is processed earlier than
actions, with the former priming the latter (Larson, 2012; Larson & Lee, 2015). They
have also shown that such spatiotemporal contexts can prime each other when encoun-
tered in sequential visual narratives (Smith & Loschky, in press). Further research is
needed to investigate the temporal order of information extraction of the full range of
key event indices across multiple fixations while viewing visual narratives. Other studies
of change blindness and edit blindness while people watch films, however, raise questions
about how much information viewers encode while viewing visual narratives (Levin &
Simons, 1997; Smith & Henderson, 2008; Smith & Martin-Portugues Santacreu, 2017). A
testable hypothesis consistent with SPECT is that viewers will detect those changes that
change important event indices in the current event model or, to a lesser degree, recently
stored event models (Sampanes et al., 2008).
4.2. The relationship between event model construction and attentional selection
SPECT assumes that not only do front-end information extraction and attentional selec-
tion processes affect back-end event model building, but also that back-end event model
building processes affect front-end processes, such as attentional selection. We have con-
ducted a series of studies that have been motivated by this general assumption and have
explored whether and how event model building affects attentional selection. However,
we have found evidence suggesting that the nature of this relation may vary as a function
of whether narratives are static (comics, pictures stories) or dynamic (TV shows, videos,
and films). Specifically, it seems that dynamic visual narratives, such as films, exert quite
a bit of exogenous control over attentional selection, as measured by eye movements, and
thus they may not afford much influence of the event model. This may be due to the fact
that dynamic visual narratives (by definition) include motion, which is the single stron-
gest stimulus feature for predicting eye movements and guiding attentional selection
(Carmi & Itti, 2006; Mital et al., 2010). Conversely, because static narratives lack motion,
and reading is self-paced, it seems that they may afford more endogenous influences on
attentional selection via the back-end event model.
First consider static sequential picture stories. Magliano et al. (2016) had viewers read
six wordless “Boy, Dog, Frog” stories. In each story, as illustrated in Fig. 1A, the authors
identified three-image sequences that showed a beginning-state (e.g., Boy running down a
hill), a bridging-event (e.g., Boy tripping over tree branch), and an end-state (e.g., Boy
face first in the pond). As shown in Fig. 1A versus 1B, Magliano et al. (2016) manipu-
lated whether the bridging-event image was present or not. When the bridging-event
image was absent, viewers would need to generate a bridging inference in order to map
event indices from the end-state picture onto their event model based on the beginning-
state image. Magliano et al. (2016) found direct evidence of this in a pilot study in which
they asked viewers to read the wordless picture stories on a computer screen, one image
at a time, and do a think aloud after each end-state image. As predicted if an inferred
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bridging event was more highly activated in WM than an actually viewed bridging event,
the authors found that participants were more likely to mention the bridging event in the
absent condition than the present condition. In a follow-up study, the authors dropped the
think-aloud task, and simply had viewers read the wordless picture stories at their own
pace, while their viewing times were recorded. Consistent with the hypothesis that view-
ers were generating bridging inferences, the authors found that viewing times were longer
when the bridging-event images were absent than when they were present.
Hutson et al. (2018) carried out a follow-up study that investigated more precisely why
viewing times were longer in the bridging-state absent condition. They measured view-
ers’ eye movements and asked whether viewing time differences were due to differences
in either mean fixation durations or the mean number of fixations. They found that there
were no differences in mean fixation durations, but there were approximately 20% addi-
tional fixations in the bridging-state absent condition relative to the bridging-event present
condition. This suggested that, rather than the bridging event generation requiring further
internal processing (during fixations), it may have required gathering additional informa-
tion (in extra fixations). Thus, Hutson et al. (2018) empirically identified regions of the
pictures that were informative for generating the bridging inference when the bridging-
state picture was absent. Consistent with the hypothesis that viewers would preferentially
fixate image regions that were more informative for generating the bridging inference,
they found that the inferential-informativeness of image regions was more strongly corre-
lated with the likelihood of eye fixations falling within them in the bridging-event absent
condition. These data demonstrate that processes that support constructing the event
model can influence attentional selection in scenes. Specifically, when visual narrative
readers detect that they need to generate an inference to support the mapping process,
their attentional selection system is engaged to support constructing that inference. Pre-
sumably, each fixation to support a bridging inference engages in information extraction,
and that process continues until either (a) sufficient knowledge in semantic LTM is acti-
vated to support generating the inference, or (b) the viewer decides that the information
is insufficient. The coordination of information extraction and attentional selection to sup-
port bridging inference generation warrants further investigation.
The story is much different in the context of film, likely because, as noted above, there
are stronger exogenous features that attract attention. SPECT assumes that the event
model will have less of an impact on attentional selection under such conditions. We
have conducted a series of studies that have shown that the nature of the event model has
a real but relatively small impact on attentional selection. Consider the film clip narrative
sequence from James Bond Moonraker used in Loschky et al. (2015) illustrated in Fig. 8.
This clip was chosen because Magliano et al. (1996) found that the use of cross cutting
in shots 3–6 (alternating shots between two locations, in this case, a man in free fall and
a circus tent) engendered a similar predictive inference, namely “the man will fall on the
circus tent,” across most viewers. Loschky et al. (2015) varied whether participants saw
the prior 2 minutes of movie context leading up to this scene, and they found that partici-
pants in the “No-context” condition were less likely to generate the predictive inference
than in the prior exposure (“Context”) condition. Thus, this manipulation changed
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viewers’ event models. However, when we measured viewers’ eye movements as they
watched the film clips, their gaze behavior indicated a high level of attentional synchrony
both within and across the Context and No-context conditions. Only in a shot that had essen-
tially no motion (Fig. 8, Shot 4), in which viewers were free to explore the shot of the circus
tent, did we find gaze differences across the two context conditions. Thus, the nature of the
event model appeared to have only a small effect on attentional selection, at least in the con-
text of this film clip. We dubbed this phenomenon the tyranny of film, because despite large
differences in viewers’ understanding, there were small differences in attentional selection,
assumedly due to the power of the film stimulus in guiding their attention.
Hutson et al. (2017) further investigated whether such tyranny of film on attentional
selection, found in a highly edited film clip, would operate in a film clip with no editing.
Given that editing practices are designed to influence attentional selection (Smith, 2012a),
perhaps a lack of editing would minimize the tyranny of film. Hutson et al. (2017)
explored this possibility by using the opening scene from Touch of Evil (Welles & Zug-
smith, 1958), which consists of a single continuous long shot (i.e., no cuts), showing two
couples navigating the streets of a Mexico/US border town. As shown in Fig. 9, the open-
ing segment shows a man setting a time bomb and putting it in the trunk of a car. Soon
after, a couple who owns the car unwittingly gets into the car and drives away. The cou-
ple in the car then passes a walking couple on the street. Hutson et al. reasoned that,
since the bomb has tremendous causal power in the event models of viewers who know
about it, if viewers had no knowledge of the bomb, they would be less likely to fixate
on the car. Thus, in Experiment 1, Hutson et al. manipulated whether participants saw
the bomb placed in the car trunk (Context condition) or not (No-context condition). Simi-
larly to Loschky et al (2015), this context manipulation strongly affected participants’
predictions of what would happen next at the end of the clip (e.g., either “the car will
explode,” or “the two couples will have dinner together”). This showed that the heavy-
handed context manipulation indeed dramatically changed the nature of viewers’ event
models for the movie clip. Surprisingly, however, Hutson et al. (2017) found equal pro-
portions of fixations on the car in both the Context (bomb-present) and No-context
(bomb-absent) conditions. Thus, this showed that the tyranny of film was still operating
even without film editing. Apparently, the structure of the long shot was such that the
movement of the car exerted exogenous control of attentional selection.
In Experiment 2 of Hutson et al. (2017), the No-context condition began watching the
clip when only the walking couple was on screen; thus, viewers would not consider the
couple in the car as protagonists. When the walking couple passed the temporarily parked
car, this was the first time viewers in the No-context condition saw it, and they were
much less likely to fixate on it than those in the Context condition. Assumedly, this was
because the No-context viewers perceived the car as background, whereas the Context
condition viewers knew about the bomb, and also treated the couple in the car as protago-
nists/agents. Hutson et al. called this the agent effect. However, once the car began to
move again, viewers in both context conditions fixated on the car equally, regardless of
knowledge of the bomb. Thus, as in Loschky et al. (2015), the effect of the event model
on attentional selection was real, but small.
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In a further control experiment, Hutson et al. (2017) found they could reduce the
tyranny of film by using a task that directed viewers’ volitional attention away from
the narrative events in the shot, namely asking viewers to prepare to draw a map
from memory of the spatial environment in the film clip. As noted earlier, SPECT
assumes that this requires the use of effortful volitional executive processes (see
Fig. 2). Additionally, Hutson et al. (2017) compared the levels of attentional syn-
chrony found in the highly edited shot sequence of James Bond Moonraker used in
Loschky et al. (2015) versus the continuous long shot from Touch of Evil. As pre-
dicted, the levels of attentional synchrony were less in the continuous long shot than
in the highly edited sequence. This analysis suggests that there may be differences in
the extent to which features of dynamic visual narratives affect the relationship
Fig. 8. Drawings of six frames from six sequential shots from James Bond Moonraker (Broccoli & Gilbert,
1979). (Reproduced with permission of Loschky et al., 2015.)
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between the event model and attentional selection, and more research is warranted to
address this issue.
4.2.1. Conclusions regarding the relationship between event model construction and
attentional selection
The studies described in this section have shown effects of event model building pro-
cesses on attentional selection in visual narratives, including both static picture stories
(Hutson et al., 2018) and movie clips (Hutson et al., 2017; Loschky et al., 2015). How-
ever, these effects appeared stronger in the static picture stories than in the film clips.
This has led us to modify the assumption of SPECT that back-end and front-end pro-
cesses have bi-directional influences. Specifically, we have added the further assumption
that the influence of event model building processes on attentional selection is moderated
by whether a visual narrative is static or dynamic. Nevertheless, this conjecture is in need
of more direct tests. More generally, the implications of differences between media in
terms of affording control over attentional selection need to be carefully explored.
Related to the above, there are likely trade-offs involved in the tyranny of film. Film-
makers can utilize the properties of film to direct viewers’ attention to specific portions
Fig. 9. Nine frames from the opening long shot of Touch of Evil (Welles & Zugsmith, 1958) and the experi-
mental conditions used in Hutson et al. (2017). The blue dashed outline indicates the video starting point in
the Context Condition (Experiments 1 and 2); the orange outline shows the starting point for the No-context
condition (Experiment 1); the green outline shows the starting point for the No-context condition (Experiment
2). (Published with permission of Hutson et al. [2017]).
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of the screen, which should affect the process of information extraction, which then
affects passive knowledge activation, which in turn affects back-end event model building
processes (e.g., Kintsch, 1988). However, the lack of opportunities for regressive eye
movements in film that might support comprehension repair is a price that is paid for the
tyranny and the lack of self-paced control. SPECT provides a motivation for research that
addresses these important issues.
5. Discussion
The intent of SPECT is to explain how visual narratives are processed and understood
from early perceptual processes to relatively late processes that support event model
building. In doing so, SPECT integrates previously separate research domains for visual
narrative perception and comprehension, which has rarely occurred in research on text
comprehension (for exceptions, see the computational models of reading, e.g., SWIFT:
Engbert, Nuthmann, Richter, & Kliegl, 2005; EZ-Reader: Reichle, Rayner, & Pollatsek,
1999). Our intent in this article was to inspire future research on the processing and com-
prehension of visual narratives that explores the interplay between multiple levels of
front- and back-end cognitive processing. We have made a case that the framework has
been invaluable in guiding our program of research on visual narrative processing, and
we contend that new research questions are afforded by it.
5.1. Future research questions
As noted above, we have been using this framework to guide a program of research.
However, that program is by no means exhaustive in addressing the important research
questions that can be derived by SPECT. In this section, we discuss pressing questions
that we believe should be addressed in order to further illustrate the utility SPECT as a
theoretical framework.
An important unanswered question raised by SPECT regarding front-end information
extraction is the temporal order of information extraction for event indices (e.g., spa-
tiotemporal framework, agents, objects, actions, goals of agents) across multiple eye
movements. As noted earlier, Larson (Larson, 2012; Larson & Lee, 2015) has begun to
answer this question by showing that the spatiotemporal event index is extracted prior to
the action underlying an event. However, further, more detailed investigations are needed
to determine when entities, their inferred goals, and inferred causal relationships are
extracted across multiple eye fixations. It seems likely that not only the spatiotemporal
context, and actions, but also the entities of agents and patients are among the first event
indices to be extracted in a new event model. Furthemore, given that identifying goals
and causal relationships require more inferential processes, these event indices are likely
extracted and generated in the event model later. However, tests of these hypotheses are
needed. Doing so would elucidate the role of front-end information extraction during sin-
gle fixations in event model building across multiple fixations in WM.
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As noted above, a key research question suggested by SPECT is whether static versus
dynamic visual narratives differ in the degree to which the event model influences atten-
tional selection. To answer this question will require at least two things: (a) visual narra-
tives in which manipulations of viewers’ event models influence attentional selection, and
(b) versions of those narratives that primarily differ in terms of the static versus dynamic
distinction. Meeting both criteria is non-trivial. However, answering this question will
more broadly help answer the question of the conditions under which the viewer’s event
model influences attentional selection in visual narratives.
A further key unanswered research question suggested by SPECT is whether and how
the back-end process of shifting to build a new event model affects the front-end process
of attentional selection (but see Huff, Papenmeier, & Zacks, 2012). Research has shown
better memory for event boundaries than middles (Huff, Meitz, & Papenmeier, 2014;
Swallow et al., 2009), suggesting that attentional selection is affected by shifting. Interest-
ingly, it is possible that attention is heightened at event boundaries (Huff et al., 2014;
Swallow et al., 2009) or, conversely, that it is diminished (Huff et al., 2012). This appar-
ent contradiction may be resolved by other results showing that gaze patterns change just
before and after event boundaries (Eisenberg & Zacks, 2016; Smith, Whitwell, & Lee,
2006), consistent with the ambient-to-focal eye movement shift—namely, attention may
expand and contract over time near event boundaries (Ringer 2016; Ringer, 2018). This
warrants further research to clarify these relationships.
We invite the reader to identify questions that have not yet been pursued. Such efforts
are essential for revisions to SPECT that would allow it to become a formalized and
implementable model. Moreover, in the pursuit of such research, we acknowledge that
alternative and perhaps contradictory frameworks could emerge. We see that possibility
as healthy and indicative of the study of visual narratives as being a vibrant and growing
area of research.
5.2. Future computational and neurophysiological tests of SPECT
SPECT is not yet a formally complete cognitive model of visual narrative processing,
primarily because many assumptions of the model remain to be empirically validated, as
laid out above. However, while it has not yet been computationally implemented, our
goal is to refine the model such that it eventually can be. Thus, future studies should
develop and test computational approximations of key elements of SPECT. For front-end
mechanisms, there are already deep neural networks that can extract the event indices
needed for laying the foundation of an event model (e.g., locations, people, animals,
objects, and actions) from video (Du, El-Khamy, Lee, & Davis, 2017; Hoai, Lan, & De
la Torre, 2011; LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015; Manohar, Sharath Kumar, Kumar, &
Rani, 2019; Zhou, Lapedriza, Khosla, Oliva, & Torralba, 2018). There are also neural
networks for attentional selection (Adeli & Zelinsky, 2018; Huang, Shen, Boix, & Zhao,
2015). For the back-end, formal ontologies use techniques such as description logics to
represent events (Baader & Nutt, 2003; Neumann & M€oller, 2008). Inferential processes
based on event representations can be modeled in terms of Bayesian weights for likely
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inferences (Bateman & Wildfeuer, 2014; Grosz & Gordon, 1999).5 A key challenge is to
link the front-end event index outputs in ways that are usable by the back-end ontologies.
The neurophysiological foundations of SPECT are based on numerous related but non-
visual-narrative-based studies. The distinction between the front-end processes of infor-
mation extraction and attentional selection is strongly supported by their implementation
within different functional brain networks, and having differentiable time courses. Front-
end information extraction of foundation event indices (i.e., locations, people, animals,
actions, and objects) is extremely rapid, with perceptual decisions occurring within 150–
225 ms post-stimulus, as shown by EEG and MEG studies (Cichy, Khosla, Pantazis, Tor-
ralba, & Oliva, 2016; Greene & Hansen, 2018; Ramkumar, Hansen, Pannasch, &
Loschky, 2016; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Such event indices can be decoded from
fMRI brain activity within functionally defined areas for locations (Walther, Caddigan,
Fei-Fei, & Beck, 2009), objects (Majaj, Hong, Solomon, & DiCarlo, 2015), and actions
(Gallivan & Culham, 2015). Front-end attentional selection is also extremely fast, with
ventral stream neurons activating roughly 100 ms before the eyes fixate an object of
interest (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 2001). Very fast stimulus saliency effects on attentional
selection are controlled by the superior colliculus (Boehnke & Munoz, 2008), and slower
back-end influences are likely controlled by the fronto-parietal and fronto-temporal net-
works (Baldauf & Desimone, 2014). Knowing these basic facts can guide research to test
front-end hypotheses of SPECT.
The functional distinction of back-end from front-end processes is also strongly sup-
ported by their having different time courses and involving different brain networks. EEG
research has shown that mapping processes, such as when the same people and/or loca-
tions recur across multiple panels in a visual narrative, elicit decreased N400 amplitude
(roughly 300–500 ms post-stimulus) (Cohn, Paczynski, Jackendoff, Holcomb, & Kuper-
berg, 2012). Importantly, consistent with SPECT, this time course is later than the 150–
225 ms needed to extract an event index (e.g., the person, the location) and is operating
over multiple items in WM. Other EEG studies have shown that mapping processes such
as updating the event model with new event indices and bridging inference generation
occur even later, eliciting the P600 (roughly 400–900 ms post-stimulus) (Cohn & Kutas,
2015). Likewise, consistent with SPECT’s assumption that mapping and shifting are sepa-
rate processes, fMRI studies have shown that they involve separate brain regions (Ezzyat
& Davachi, 2011). SPECT further argues that shifting at event boundaries leads the event
model in WM to be stored in LTM. Consistent with this claim, fMRI studies have shown
event boundaries lead to activity in parietal and posterior medial cortex being temporarily
synchronized (Baldassano et al., 2017; Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011). Such interactions
between brain areas involved in front-end and back-end processes are critical predictions
of SPECT, but the bidirectionality of these predicted interactions requires considerable
further neuroimaging support.
Additionally, SPECT assumes that event segmentation is similar across different repre-
sentational formats, which has been supported by fMRI studies showing the same poste-
rior-medial network (Inhoff & Ranganath, 2017) being engaged when reading written
narratives (Baldassano et al., 2017; Speer, Zacks, & Reynolds, 2007) and watching visual
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narratives (Baldassano et al., 2017; Kurby & Zacks, 2018; Zacks et al., 2001). This fur-
ther supports the relevance of research from outside of the context of visual narratives for
establishing the neurophysiological bases of SPECT. Indeed, processing visual narratives
likely involves a complex coordination of neurophysiological systems that are both
domain-specific (Cohn & Maher, 2015) and domain-general (Cohn, 2019a, 2019b).
Future studies should use behavioral and computational modeling methods together
with neuroimaging methods to test hypotheses of SPECT in terms of their time course or
functional differentiation. Furthermore, while research using non-visual-narrative materi-
als is valuable for understanding the neurophysiological bases of SPECT, there is behav-
ioral evidence, and some neurophysiological evidence, that visual narratives require
processing unique to each medium (Cohn & Ehly, 2016; Cohn & Maher, 2015; Smith,
2012a; Smith, Levin, & Cutting, 2012) and may require specialized literacy skills (Cohn,
2019b; Cohn & Magliano, in press; Schwan & Ildirar, 2010). Thus, future tests of the
neurophysiological bases of SPECT should prioritize visual narratives.
5.3. Limitations of SPECT
What is missing from SPECT? One obvious limitation of SPECT is that it does not
specify how prior world knowledge supports the comprehension of visual narratives. In
contrast, theories of text comprehension focus on how semantic knowledge is activated
and integrated into a mental model for a text (McNamara & Magliano, 2009). The com-
plexities of exploring how front-end process support mental model construct are such
that, at this juncture, we deem this to be a necessary omission.
As described here, SPECT principally applies to traditional non-interactive media
(though reading comics and picture stories allows self-pacing). SPECT does not account
for visual narrative experience in which the viewer is also an active participant, such as
video game and virtual reality experiences. Given that first-person experiences are pro-
cessed in similar fashion to narrative experiences (Magliano, Radvansky, Forsythe, &
Copeland, 2014), SPECT should be able to accommodate these experiences. However,
the fact that one is an active agent in many of these contexts will obviously have implica-
tions for attentional selection. SPECT neglects the rich and important social aspects (e.g.,
communal viewing at a cinema, or a parent reading a picture book to their child) and
emotional aspects (i.e., the affective profile of joy and despair so important to narrative
arcs) of visual narratives. This is a systemic issue with many theories of comprehension,
but it does not imply that these processes are unimportant for comprehension.
Probably the most important current omission is that SPECT specifically describes the
relationship between visual processing and event model construction, but it does not
describe how written or auditory information (linguistic and non-linguistic) contributes to
the understanding of visual narratives. Cohn similarly does not specify how linguistic
information is processed in his theory of visual narrative processing (Cohn, 2013a),
though he acknowledges the importance of understanding the relationship between text
and images (Cohn, 2016; Manfredi, Cohn, & Kutas, 2017) and sounds and images (Man-
fredi, Cohn, De Araujo Andreoli, & Boggio, 2018) in sequential visual narratives in
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conveying meaning. Auditory information is vital to the practices of storytelling in film-
making (Batten & Smith, 2018; Bordwell, 1985) and representations of speech, thought,
narration, and sound effects are vital to storytelling in comics (Cohn, 2013a). Moreover,
when comic panels contain a large amount of text, readers allocate considerable atten-
tional resources to process the text, and there is some suggestion that image content may
be processed in parafoveal vision (Laubrock et al., 2018). Furthermore, in film, auditory
and linguistic content support inference processes (Magliano et al., 1996). However,
given the complexities of understanding the relationship between visual perception and
event cognition, we argue that this is a necessary omission at this juncture.
5.4. Conclusion
With SPECT, we have taken the first steps toward outlining a comprehensive cognitive
framework for visual narrative processing which extends from momentary attentional
selection and information extraction from visual images to the longer-scale creation and
maintenance of event models in WM and LTM. This theoretical framework incorporates
contemporary theories of all of these stages of visual scene perception, event perception,
and narrative comprehension, but by applying SPECT to complex visual narratives, a
number of important ruptures, inconsistencies, and gaps in our understanding have
emerged. Most important, as previously stated in relation to film (Smith, Levin, et al.,
2012), by theorizing about and studying how we process visual narratives, we learn more
about how we perceive and make sense of the real world.
Notes
1. Here “fixation” refers to all periods of low-velocity gaze stability relative to ele-
ments within a scene, whether the element is static, moving (e.g., a driving car), or
moving on the retina due to head/body movement as we move our head in front of
an image (e.g., the page of a comic). For further discussion of “fixation” defini-
tions, see Hessels et al. (2018).
2. Note that much of this work was done on the topic of transsaccadic memory,
namely memory across a saccade. That work eventually determined that the con-
tents of transsaccadic memory are in short-term memory or WM (Irwin, 1996).
3. The regions of interest include speech balloons, though language, narrowly defined,
is beyond the scope of SPECT, so we will not discuss the speech balloons or dialog
here.
4. Research has shown comic readers’ first fixations within panels were more likely
sent to characters than to background elements (Laubrock et al., 2018), which
might suggest that characters are processed before backgrounds. This is consistent
with the person bias, namely if an image of a person is present in a photograph,
viewers’ first fixation usually goes to that person (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2008;
Humphrey & Underwood, 2010). However, Laubrock et al. (2018, p. 249) point
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out that comic readers can likely recognize the gist of the background within their
first fixation of a comic panel using their peripheral vision (i.e., without fixating it).
Specifically, studies have shown that, within a single fixation on a photograph,
viewers can accurately categorize the scene background (e.g., beach vs. mountain
vs. street vs. bedroom) using only their peripheral vision (Boucart, Moroni, Thi-
baut, Szaffarczyk, & Greene, 2013; Larson & Loschky, 2009; Loschky, Szaffar-
czyk, Beugnet, Young, & Boucart, 2019). Thus, it is currently unclear whether the
category of a background or of a character is processed earlier while viewing visual
narratives.
5. We thank John A. Bateman and William H. Hsu for help in conceptualizing com-
putational modeling for these back-end processes and providing relevant references.
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